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ABSTRACT 
 
The goal of this paper is to assess the effect of regulatory burdens in the European dairy 
industry on its competitiveness. A theoretical foundation is provided by transaction cost 
economics and total quality management insights. The effects of legislation on administrative 
requirements and competitiveness are supposed to be mediated by impacts on innovativeness, 
company strategy, food safety system availability, as well as the available information & 
communication capabilities. We will connect to previous research (Wijnands et al., 2007) 
and the findings therein. Four sub-questions are addressed: 
• what is the relationship between administrative burdens, innovation and competitiveness? 
• what is the relationship between administrative burdens, food safety & quality system 
deployment and  competitiveness? 
• what is the relationship between administrative burdens, food labelling requirements and 
competitiveness? 
• what is the relationship between administrative burdens, supply chain transparency and 
competitiveness?  
In addition to the theoretical framework presented earlier in Bremmers et al., 2008, this paper 
contains the first results of a survey in the European dairy industry. They are combined with 
the proceeds from a literature search. The results show that (Q1) especially product 
innovation is negatively impacted by administrative burdens. Food safety and quality systems 
(Q2) serve to provide a level playing field in Europe. They would be installed also if no legal 
requirements would enforce them, because clients ask for it, so that administrative burdens 
could easily be attributed to business strategy rather than legal obligations. To reduce 
administrative burdens, we advice to integrate food safety and quality requirements is 
necessary. It would reduce monitoring and reporting costs, both for private as well as public 
parties. Food labeling (Q3) (a ‘made in Europe’ origin marking) could work contra-
productive with respect to the competitive position of dairy firms and will have an increase 
of administrative burdens as a net-effect. And last but not least (Q4), increased chain 
transparency (mentioning the name of intermediary producers on the end-product package) 
will accelerate administrative burdens, but will only be beneficial for SMEs with a 
differentiated product. Commodity-producers in the dairy industry which only follow a cost 
strategy will gradually merge and/or disappear. 
 
Key words dairy industry, competitiveness, administrative burdens, food safety, labelling 
1. Introduction 
 
This paper addresses the research outline and first results of a project to assess the effect of 
administrative burdens, caused by food legislation, on the competitiveness of the European 
dairy industry. The project is carried out for the EU (DG Enterprise) in cooperation with the 
MoniQa network. It encompasses the effects of administrative burdens, labeling, legal 
prescriptions as well as business dynamics on the future state of the industry. It serves as a 
foundation for policy development to increase competitiveness as well as food safety and 
quality. Previous studies (Wijnands et al. 2007) are taken as a starting point. A theoretical 
foundation was presented earlier (Brememrs et al., 2008), which will be used as a framework 
for statistical analysis. We present first results of our study by addressing four questions: 
 what is the relationship between administrative burdens, innovation and competitiveness? 
 what is the relationship between administrative burdens, food safety & quality 
deployment and  competitiveness? 
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 what is the relationship between administrative burdens, food labelling requirements and 
competitiveness? 
 what is the relationship between administrative burdens, supply chain transparency and 
competitiveness?  
 
As a result of the Lisbon call “to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based 
economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and 
greater social cohesion” (cited in CIAA-a, 2005), initiatives have been taken to improve 
legislation and (thereby) reducing administrative burdens. Administrative burdens are a result 
of public intervention, which is an alternative to the rule of the free market. Public 
intervention may use instruments like: information procurement, process standards, product 
performance standards and pecuniary measures (Henson and Traill, 1993).Governance of the 
European food industry poses a choice between self-regulation (of which voluntary labelling 
is an example) and command-and–control (of which mandatory food labelling is an example), 
or a combination of these (Sinclair, 1997). Self-regulation does not make companies survive 
in a competitive environment, on the contrary (Rumelt 1990, Reinhardt 1999, Christmann and 
Taylor 2001). In the past decennia, regulatory stringency has been the dominant instrument to 
achieve food safety and sustainable production. However, the deployment of a “hierarchical 
enforcement”-policy is considered by many as inefficient and costly, stifling innovation and 
inviting enforcement difficulties (Fairman and Yapp 2005).  
Many companies in the European food industry belong to SMEs (< 250 employees), 
employing 61.3% of personnel in the sector (CIAA-a, 2005, p.4). They especially experience 
burdens because of legislative stringency. Such burdens diminish the possibilities to export 
and imprt. Lengthy customs’ procedures are one indicative factor explaining the lack of 
export growth (CIAA-b 2006, p.28). Profit-seeking firms will only comply to regulatory 
requirements if the benefits of complying are bigger than the costs; or alternatively stated, if 
the disadvantages of not-complying exceed the costs of complying (Cornelissen, 2004b; 
Henson and Heasman, 1998, referring to Baron and Baron, 1980; Ogus, 1992). If marginal 
error costs are low, it follows that individuals will not spend much money on information 
costs. Where marginal error costs are high (for instance: possibility of death, heavy injury, 
costly recalls in food industry etc.), the willingness to spend money on information 
procurement will be high. Since food consumption is perceived as a serious cause for possible 
personal harm, the willingness to spend costs on reducing such risk through information may 
be high. 
In general, excessive administrative burdens increase transaction costs in the market and will 
therefore impede on the competitiveness of food firms. It is not clear in advance whether 
administrative requirements are higher in a common law system (UK, US) or in a regulatory 
(European, continental) system of law. Possibly the ex ante costs (costs of acquiring and 
assimilating information before the legal rule is formulated) are higher (Ogus, 1992) in a 
continental system, which is based on prevention of risks, in stead of litigation. On the 
contrary, the ex-post costs in a common law system will presumably be higher. The 
theoretical foundations (transaction cost economics and cost of quality theory) which can 
explain business behaviour, are addressed in § 3. With tehse insights we will assess the 
perceived influence of food legislation on dairy sector competitiveness. First however we will 
delineate the administrative burden concept in the next paragraph. 
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2. Delineation of concepts 
 
Administrative burden is a concept easily used in politics. But there are different definitions in 
use and it is not easy to be precise. It is an expressed goal of the Commission to reduce 
administrative burdens by 25% in 2012. The effect that is expected from a reduction on EU- 
as well as national levels is an increase of GDP of 1.4% (€ 150 bln) in the mid-term 
(COM(2007)23 ref. to: Gelauff and Lejour (2005)). For instance, for The Netherlands at the 
end of 2002 the administrative burdens were € 23,780 per firm (€ 16.4 bln for 689 623 
companies in total, as to the Dutch EIM/CBS; Suyver and Tom, 2004), while in 2007, on the 
basis of Ministry plans in 2002, these burdens should be € 3 bln lower, reducing the average 
burdens with € 4,500. However, it was also projected that large firms would benefit 13 times 
more than small firms. Small companies were projected to benefit € 3560 (in total: 76%), 
medium-sized companies € 7327 and big companies € 45,735 (Suyver and Tom, 2004, table 
2). Other countries and organizations have proposed similar policy goals. The delineation of 
administrative burdens (based on the standard cost model) is given in figure 1. Administrative 
burdens as to EU definitions refer to all information requirements (either to public or private 
bodies) that are induced by regulatory activity and would not be collected if such legal 
obligations would not exist.   
Regulatory
burdens
For public       
authorities, 
voluntary sector 
and citizens
For
enterpr ises
Direct financial costs
Long-term structural
consequencs
Compliance costs
Direct financial costs
Long-term structural
consequencs
Compliance costs
Substantive
compliance
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Administrative
costs
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Administrative
costs
Enforced
Administrative
costs
Substantive
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Administrative
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Administrative
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Administrative
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Figure 1: Delineation of Administrative burdens (based on COM(2007)23). 
 
Specifications of the concept ‘administrative burdens’ are found in the outline that describes 
the Dutch Standard Cost Model to assess such costs. In the Dutch version (The Hague, 2003) 
a distinction is made between obligations to “do or don’t”, and information obligations. As to 
the Dutch system, administrative burdens are costs to enterprises to come up to information 
obligations which result from regulation and legislation by the government. Costs from self-
regulation are not covered by the administrative burden concept.  
Within this research a narrow definition of administrative burdens is “the information costs 
which are caused by changing legal requirements and made for complying with them”. We 
call these “level 1 costs” (figure 2). They can be borne by administrative bodies and/or for 
private enterprises. A broad view encompasses all impacts to administrative and/or private 
bodies (so also other costs, expressed in money terms, than information costs are included; 
this we call: level 2 costs. An even more broadened view encompasses not only financial 
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burdens, but also qualitative impediments (like environmental and social impacts): this is 
“level 3 costs”. The investigation of such causal effects is of importance for the construction 
of an impact analysis. Last, also the voluntarily imposed burdens are included (like a private 
ISO-systems which is installed to protect food safety, and the like (this is level 4 in our 
analysis). We adopt this broad view. However, empirical results should be organized in such a 
way, that data on the other levels can be provided also. 
information costs as
a result of complying
expressed in money terms
I
II
I+ including other financial 
costs/effects
III II + non-financial effects
IV
III + voluntary measures for 
regulatory requirements
 
Figure 2: A broad view on administrative burdens 
 
Cumulative administrative burdens are caused by unnecessary legislation. Unnecessary 
legislation hampers international trade and competition. Regulations are called unnecessary 
(cumulative) if they are not necessary for coming up to the goal of legislation or for 
guaranteeing the level of protection the Treaties offer. WTO-articles (article XX) and 
Agreements (with respect to Trade, Sanitary and Phyto-sanitary measures for instance), 
restrict regulation to a level that obstructs international trade more than necessary to reach the 
legal objective (Kalinova, 2005).  
As expressed, unnecessary or extra regulations (‘goldplating’) can cause avoidable costs and 
obstruct competitiveness substantially. For instance, the costs of plant variety protection with 
a 15 years’ protection period are $ 5687 in China, $ 10,480 in the EU and $ 4344 in the US 
(based on Louwaars et al., 2005 cited in: Tripp et al., 2007).  
An example of ‘goldplating’ outside the food sector is given by Directive 95/46/EU, 
governing the protection of privacy. The EU-directive contains 72 considerations and 34 
articles, while the Dutch implementation (Wbp) contains more than is required with a 
minimal implementation: 200 considerations and 83 articles.  
Regulatory burdens are a result of legal content, but also of their form (clearness, consistency 
etc.) As to Cuijpers (2006) vague and open norms, complexity and uncertainty of 
interpretation, new procedures and burdens, dis-congruence with the privacy-understanding of 
the citizen as well as the lack of stimuli for self-regulation are the result of excessive legal 
requirements. The extra costs to be considered in this respect are classified as mechanic costs 
(implementation of new prescriptions, handling and IT-costs) as well as organisation costs 
(education, information etc.) accelerate costs of information processing.  
We try to assess the effect of administrative requirements from a theoretical viewpoint, which 
is described in § 3. 
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3. Theoretical framework 
 
Two complementary theoretical orientations are used to investigate the effect of regulatory 
burdens, including its costs, on competitiveness of individual firms. We use:  
- the total quality management framework (TQM) 
- the transaction cost framework (TCE) 
Total quality management is a practical approach to enhance product as well as process 
quality aspects, strategic attitude (top-management involvement) and organizational 
behaviour through empowerment of employees. Consumer needs, not technological 
governance, is the starting-point of all quality processes (Spencer, 1994; Hackman and 
Wageman, 1995). The basic idea is that quality (i.e., legislation) has a price which could be 
excessive compared to the advantages, so that the net-effect is negative. Prevention costs 
increase with higher levels of quality assurance (within this outline: of regulatory 
stringency), while at the same time failure costs are reduced (costs of non-compliance, such 
as is the case with food-borne diseases etc.). While the European system fosters prevention 
(risk avoidance), the US-system of litigation fosters compensation of failure. The question is 
what, at the firm level, is the ‘ideal’ combination is of both policies. To solve this problem, 
prevention costs have to be weighted against failure costs.  
Transaction cost theory provides a new perspective on the structuring of economic 
organisation (David and Han, 2004; Geyskens et al., 2006; Poppo & Zenger, 2002). While 
former theorizing conceptualized a firm as a production function, transaction cost economics 
regards a firm as a governance mechanism (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997; Williamson, 1998). 
Likewise, economic organisation can be governed in a hierarchical way (like a –vertically 
integrated – firm by means of government intervention) or leave the economic exchange and 
its characteristics to the market. Hierarchies (integration) cause bureaucratic costs.  However, 
dimensions of governance like the necessity of asset specific investments (translated to the 
study at hand: investments in for instance quality assurance systems induced by buyers to 
enhance food safety, combined with lack of or asymmetrically distributed information, or 
(market) uncertainty can lead to opportunistic behaviour and shirking, so that a hierarchy is 
preferred (in our research: governmental intervention is necessary).  
We propose the following research model which visualizes the expected effect of regulatory 
burdens and key factors (innovativeness, strategy, food safety system availability and 
information processing capabilities) impacting on the competitiveness of a highly innovative 
sector, like dairy is (see figure 3). 
Changing 
legal 
framework 
of the dairy 
sector:
- content
- form
level of innovativeness
Administrative 
burdens
Dairy sector 
competitiveness
Food safety system 
availability
Other burdens 
(financial and non -
financial)
Company strategy
Information processing
capabilities
Company size
Industry variables
Product characteristics
Supply chain structure
Figure 3: Framework for the analysis of  competitiveness of dair y industry
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Components of the research model (figure 3) are addressed in the following sub-sections.  
 
Innovativeness and strategy 
While the European dairy industry in general is innovative, the spread in innovativeness is 
very wide, ranging from companies that for instance pack milk and try to optimize processes, 
and companies that modify the basic characteristics of inputs (Omega3 for instance) and/or 
output (for instance dairy products to which health claims will be attached). Administrative 
requirements will hamper the acquisition of capabilities to innovate because of resource 
scarcity at the firm level (compare: Avermaete et al., 2004; Batterink et al., 2006; Romijn 
and Albaladejo, 2002; Loader and Hobbs, 1999). The perception of a set of rules being 
`burdensome`, is dependent on the firm-specific aims and strategies that are deployed. Firm 
strategies can be classified from ‘defender’ to ‘prospector’ (Miles et al., 1978). A defender 
company will, in general, tend towards a cost-oriented strategy. Prospector companies 
aggressively seek for new market opportunities and develop new products and/or markets to 
outperform competitors. Since the EU food industry is control-oriented, efficiency-seeking 
defender companies are probably better off with legal strictness than prospector companies. 
Prospector companies are well equipped for product change with available R&D-departments 
and information and communication resources. Their innovativeness and dynamic business 
renewal can be affected along two legal routes: formal and content. Searching for causes for 
excessive administrative burdens should therefore include an investigation of the formal 
aspects connected to law change: its predictability, consistency, proportionality and the level 
of perceived behavioral control of changes in production and/or product characteristics 
 
Food safety system availability 
Food safety systems can improve transparency and consumer’s trust, but in many cases 
companies are obliged to install or expand information systems on legal grounds (for 
instance to adjust for food labelling requirements; see: Caswell and Padberg, 1992; 
Przyrembel, 2004). Administrative burdens are among others induced by compulsory quality 
systems (like HACCP). Especially SMEs will possibly be more than proportionally affected 
in their profitability, while at the same time they cannot easily harvest the “quality-
premium”. Executing food safety requirements causes operational costs, while also 
prevention costs will accelerate administrative requirements. Prevention costs are costs 
which are made to avoid a-conformity with legal requirements. Companies can be confronted 
with higher administrative loads, but could take this for granted for different reasons, like 
improved competitive power and/or a better food and drink safety/quality.   
To get insight in the dynamic process of absorption of legal requirements we will have to 
investigate what the perceived advantages and/or disadvantages are for dairy companies of 
such obligations. 
 
Information and communication capabilities 
Information and communication capabilities play a role in two different settings: 
- communicating upward and downward the supply chain; 
- communicating with and understanding of the dynamics of the institutional environment. 
 
Companies vertically communicate with market parties by means of product labels. Whereas 
product labels create transparency on (among others) the characteristics of the supply chain, 
private labels play a special function in this respect. Private labels are “all merchandise sold 
under a retailer’s brand. That brand can be the retailer’s own name or a name created 
exclusively by that retailer(…)” (Private Label manufacturers’ Association definition in: 
Bergès-Sennou et al., 2008). They can create homogeneity with respect to a multitude of 
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suppliers on the one hand, but on the other hand the craftsmanship of intermediate companies 
is hidden. This is the more disadvantageous for the intermediary company the more 
innovative it is, since innovation has a price which can only be earned back by means of a 
premium on the selling price. With the private label holder controlling the distribution 
channel, it is a matter of negotiation whether such a premium is harvested. Private label 
holders will take a strong position because of the scale at which they buy. Moreover, if an 
intermediary producer also serves the consumer market directly (which could take place in 
competition with the private label it supplies), he experiences price erosion and sales decline. 
We expect that companies with well-developed information and communication capabilities 
will be more open towards the business and institutional environment, and will be able to 
understand and predict legal requirements with more ease. Since the development of such 
capabilities costs scarce resources, big companies will most likely be better able to do so. 
Size is therefore an important control variable in this research. 
 
Control variables: Size, Network embeddedness and product charachteristics 
There are a number of firm characteristics (‘control variables’ in the research framework in 
figure 3) that influence the effect of the legal framework on competitiveness. An important 
control variable is the size of companies. SMEs might be confronted with disproportionally 
larger compliance costs, because economies of scale are lacking (Loader and Hobbs, 1999). 
Companies are, to a smaller or larger extent, entangled in a web of relationships, forcing 
them to adopt the norms and practices in the business network. But they also can be change-
oriented and put their own goals and standards first, relying on unique resources to adjust 
their environment inside-out (Porter and Kramer, 2006). In practice, both tendencies can 
occur at the same time and in the same organization.  
Specific requirements with respect to dairy product (like absence of dioxin in raw milk) will 
have an impact on the production and procurement processes of raw material. Also, 
differences between countries will affect the competitive position of European dairy industry. 
Last but not least, generic trends and tendencies in the business environment (which can be 
categorized by means of Porter’s diamond) will affect the individual firms. Differences 
between countries or regional differences on a global basis will have to be considered. 
 
4. Data collection 
 
We (LEI, Wageningen University, Moniqa network) composed a survey questionnaire 
(available at http://www3.lei.wur.nl/selectsurvey) and questioned micro, small and medium 
sized as well as large enterprises on the different topics. 
We combined new questions on innovation and strategy with questions which were also used 
in previous research (Wijnands et al., 2007), to facilitate sector-industry comparisons. 
Moreover, we redirected the focus of the questionnaire to the dairy industry and to 
international benchmarking (not included in this paper). Dairy firms were addressed in The 
Netherlands, France, Germany, UK, Italy and in Poland. For benchmark reasons also Brazil 
and the US were involved. To ensure a sufficient level of response, we sent a survey to 
members of each sub-group.  Of each participating country 100-200 addresses were selected. 
Despite additional efforts to improve the response rate (telephone calls to more than 300 firms 
in The Netherlands, France, UK and US, second mailing to France, involvement of research 
institutes/universities in Germany, Italy and Brazil), the response was still low when this 
paper was composed (mid 2008). 28 valid cases (dairy companies) have been included in the 
data of this paper. Some preliminary results and conclusions on the hypothesized relationships 
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are addressed in the next sections. They were obtained by combining literature search, 
responses on the questionnaire and interviews/discussions with key players in the field. 
5. Results 
 
In this section the preliminary results of the study are reviewed. 
 
5.1 Innovation 
 
The first research question was: 
 
What is the relationship between administrative burdens, innovation and competitiveness? 
 
As Wijnands et al. (2007) already showed, market entrance is limited by heavy legal 
requirements such as pre-market approval schemes (which is especially the case with 
additives, sweeteners, GMO-related food, supplements, novel and functional foods, as well 
as novel packaging and enzymes). This works to the disadvantage of the innovativeness of 
SMEs, who lack the resources to come up to strict legal requirements. Process innovations 
are necessary to increase efficiency in a globalizing market. For SMEs innovation takes 
therefore the structure of combining new impulses with existing skills and routines (Gielen et 
al., 2003). So a cause for a drain of resources is vested in the required systems to guard for 
food related diseases and food quality. A low cost strategy (by improving processes) is more 
in line with a policy of food safety system implementation than a policy of flexibility and 
product change (§ 2). So we tried to link the strategy of the company with perceived barriers 
for innovation. 
 
To investigate the strategy that the companies apply, we asked a question to assess whether 
the product is adjusted to local taste (multi-domestic strategy) or whether a global strategy is 
used. Moreover, we tried to identify the defenders (in line with a low cost strategy) and the 
prospectors (differentiation strategy; aiming at high quality).  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Multidomestic
Global
Low cost
High quality
SD
MEAN
 
Figure 4: Strategic orientation of companies (7 point scale; N = 21 – 23) 
  
We conclude from the data represented in figure 4, that companies in the European dairy 
industry focus more on high quality than on low cost, which is in line with the innovative 
character of the subsector. 
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We classified the type of the firms’ innovation from a Schumpeterian viewpoint (product 
process, organization, market, raw materials). It appeared that product change scores highest. 
This is in line with the idea of a highly innovative subsector.  
What then are the barriers for innovation in the dairy industry?  
0
0,5
1
1,5
2
2,5
3
3,5
4
4,5
HACCP Traceability
requirements
GMO/Novel
food
requirements
Labelling Administrative Other
MEAN
SD
 
Figure 5: Innovation barriers [N= 17-20; 7 point scale] 
 
Figure 5 shows that labeling requirements are a serious threat to innovation, as well as 
(second in position) administrative obligations. This is congruent with our theoretical 
analysis: companies which are innovative, will perceive to be hampered more by 
bureaucratic information structures.  
 
5.2 Food safety and quality systems 
 
The second research question was: 
 
What is the relationship between administrative burdens, food safety & quality system 
(FSQS) deployment and competitiveness? 
 
On average, the respondents appeared to have 3.5 FSQSs, of which an average of 2.3 is 
certified. This is a certification rate of 58%. The survey results show further that especially 
certified HACCP is considered of primary importance for compliance. This is not surprising, 
since HACCP is an obligatory system in the dairy industry. Also retailer systems (like BRC) 
score high. This expresses the positive aspects of supply chain integration: it takes away 
responsibilities with respect to compliance from the shoulders of the (smaller) upstream 
producers to a degree, and centralizes administrative burdens (with positive scale effects as a 
result).  
Dominant argument for installing food safety and quality systems are not primarily 
governmental demands, but consumer wishes. This is in line with the own expectations with 
respect to such systems towards suppliers However, some respondents commented the great 
diversity of systems and standards between EU-countries. This will, as a consequence, have a 
negative impact on export performance.  
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Figure 6: Effects of food legislation (N = 23) 
 
Figure 6 illustrates that on the one side administrative FSQS-activities have increased, but on 
the other side increased costs have to be made to provide the necessary documentation. FSQS 
deployment appears to be provoked by at least two parties: legislative authorities and 
customers (especially in b-to-b transactions).  
The obligatory introduction of HACCP causes relatively higher adjustment costs in SMEs 
than the impact this legislation will have in large organizations. HACCP places burdens on 
SMEs because of documentation, validation and verification requirement (Taylor, 2001). 
Barriers for SMEs for smooth HACCP-implementation are the lack of skills, training and 
technical expertise as well as lack of time and money (Taylor, 2001). On the other hand, 
benefits can be discerned (and were reported) which can be typified as market-driven 
(enhanced reputation etc.) or supply-side driven (improvements in efficiency, see Henson & 
Holt, 2000). Other benefits are increased focus in the organization, team-building, as well as 
the provision of legal protection (Taylor, 2001). The perceived importance of HACCP and its 
benefits towards customers which are discerned on the basis of the empirical material 
underlines this statement.  
A distinction should be made between those organizations that are heavily embedded; they 
tend to copy procedures and rely on safety systems to reduce liability and conform to market 
standards, ánd companies that act on a “stand-alone”-basis. Companies that already have 
systems like ISO or certified HACCP available will absorb new legal requirements with 
more ease than companies which do dispose of such systems. Safety systems reduce 
organizational flexibility. Highly product-innovative companies will rely on a flexible 
attitude towards the market and put efforts in R&D to change basic product characteristics. 
Such companies will regard governmental interference and prescriptions that impede on 
flexibility as burdensome. In the US, barriers to market entrance are lower because of a 
fundamental different way of governing newly developed food and foodstuffs. The legal 
culture in the US is more repressive compared with Europe, while the European food culture 
is preventive of a kind. It is a matter of moral and political choice to make shifts on the scale 
of repressive – preventive food legislation. While the US is shifting gradually towards a more 
preventive system, the EU is holding its position and trying to reduce the extra (prevention) 
costs this takes at the same time. 
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Figure 7: Safety level and administrative burdens (N = 24) 
 
In line with the 2007-study on competitiveness in general of the food industry (Wijnands et 
al., 2007), the respondents of this survey signaled that they oppose to further increase of 
administrative loads, but they are not willing to sacrifice food safety to reduce compliance 
costs (figure 7). 
 
5.3 Labelling 
 
The third research question was: 
 
What is the relationship between administrative burdens, food labeling requirements and 
competitiveness? 
 
The role of food labels from a transaction cost perspective is the improve information 
processing so that contracting is facilitated. 
Labelling can be regarded as an instrument to promote market efficiency, or as an instrument 
to control firms. Both are directed at protecting buyers from inefficient purchase decisions. 
Perceptions on the usefulness of labelling information affect the opinion whether or not 
mandatory nutritional labelling would be beneficial (Gracia et al., 2006). However, 
usefulness of labelling information does not always implicate that buying behaviour is 
adjusted (see in this respect: Hefle et al., 2007). With respect to origin labelling, an extensive 
research by Loureiro and Umberger (2007) in the US shows that USDA food safety 
inspection with respect to beef is preferred by U.S. consumers over country-of-origin 
labelling. As to these authors indication of origin makes sense if the origin stands for higher 
food safety or quality. Another example in this respect is eco-labelling. Despite European 
efforts to establish authorized, non-compulsory ecological labeling (Eco-label I in CEE 
92/880 and Eco-label II in CE 1980/2000; Proto et al., 2007), variations in eco-labels are 
widespread and more confusing than informative. As to Van Amstel et al. (2006) the 
reliability of information of five investigated food labels showed severe shortcomings, and 
did not fill the information gap between seller and buyer. 
 
In general, changes in labeling requirements can lead to additional costs: design of new 
packaging, information overload to the consumer (problems to digest extra information on 
the package) and subsequently loss of effect, information gathering costs with respect to form 
and content etc. A premium is harvested, if labeling contributes to the value of a brand. A 
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brand value is economically expressed as the value of an image and/or reputation. Image 
expresses the public’s short-run beliefs, while a reputation is more durable (Marwick and 
Fill, 1997 in: Berthon et al., 2008).  
Mark-of-origin labeling is recognized as a source for improved competitive performance if 
such labeling indicates superior quality and/or safety. Probably especially in internal 
communal trade, EU- labeling renders no significant contribution to welfare. In international 
business relationships it can have a definite function, especially to those countries that lack 
superior quality and/or safety levels (i.e. uncertainty in food safety is high). In general, 
reading frequency of food labels appears to be dependent on the degree of uncertainty about 
the food supply (Wandel, 1997), which is bigger in less-developed countries. Golan et al. 
2001 suggest that the costs of origin labeling exceed the benefits, which is in line with other 
studies (for instance: Blank, 1998, in Golan et al., 2001).  
Private labels and labels of producer’s brands serve similar functions as food labels: they 
inform about the characteristics of the product and the supply chain behind it. Co-labelling 
(printing the producer’s name on the package) is one of the possible options to create chain 
transparency. It appeared that the companies in the sample on average do not expect strong 
positive effects of stepping-up labeling efforts. Standpoints are logically very diverse. 
Retailers which already express their own company name on the package will oppose, while 
producers upstream will possibly value the benefits of the system. Private label holders will 
clearly oppose, because mentioning producer’s brands on the package is contrary to the 
intentions of private labeling. Further disadvantages of co-labelling are technical and 
financial of a kind:  
• often there are many contributors to the end-product; if this is the case, increased 
transparency will lead progressively to information processing costs; 
• costs of monitoring and control will be exorbitant; 
• the delineation of which producers are mentioned on the label (defining the scope) will, 
under conditions of a multitude of co-processors, be only realized at great cost; 
• even if the input for the end-product is homogeneous, it could be that there are a 
multitude of (small) suppliers; the costs for the end-producer would be exorbitant. 
If, however, such supply chain transparency should be realized, it can be done by means of: 
- an obligation to mention the name of the producers upstream; 
- giving a producer upstream to claim that his name will be put on the package; 
- facilitating the end-producer to mention the names of suppliers on the package. 
0 0,5 1 1,5 2 2,5 3 3,5
Obligation
Claim
Opportunity to
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MEAN
 
   Figure 8: Options for co-labelling (N = 22; 7 – point scale). 
 14 
 
On average (figure 8), there appears not to be much support for any of the options, but 
standard deviations are very high. Preferences within the dairy industry are, as mentioned, 
possibly dependent on the actual circumstances and position in the supply chain a company 
takes in. We discerned a negative (but non-significant) relationship between size (number of 
personnel) and the preference of a system that installs the obligation to print the name of 
producers upstream on the package of the end-product. 
 
5.4 Transparency 
 
The fourth research question was: 
 
What is the relationship between administrative burdens, supply chain transparency and 
competitiveness?  
 
As already mentioned, transparency can regard the supply chain and the dynamics of the 
institutional environment. We asked ourselves in the previous sub-paragraph what the 
significance is of stepping-up labeling requirements.. Additionally, we gathered empirical 
information on the transparency of legal rules to the dairy companies. We asked questions 
concerning the clearness of the rules that apply to the company, and their predictability.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9Level of informedness [N= 21] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Transparency of legislation (N=22) 
 
In general, companies in the sample appear to be well informed about the present and 
upcoming legislation that applies to their business unit (figure 9). This result is in line with 
the outcomes of the competitiveness study of Wijnands et al., 2007. Companies indicate they 
have a more than average developed information system, and are reasonably well able to 
predict future food regulation developments.  
Transparency in the food chain concerns, among others, the relationship between retailer and 
producer. However empirical work about producer-retailer relationships is rare (Bergès-
Sennou et al., 2008). Lack of clearness and transparency will invoke SMEs to mimicry the 
behavior of larger organizations in their sector. SMEs are less well informed than bigger 
companies about present and future legislation. We combined the results on the level of 
informedness with a size measure (number of personnel). The results show, that in general 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
well informed about
present legislation
well developed
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well informed about
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bigger companies are in general better informed about the present state of regulatory 
requirements, and have more certified food safety &quality systems at their disposal.  
Last, the question “The food legislation which applies to our own company is good” was 
asked. EU dairy industry legislation scores on average 4.68 on a 7-point scale. This is in line 
with the positive picture of the previous report (Wijnands et al., 2007). 
6. Conclusions and final remarks 
 
This paper provided an outline for the further research of the effect of administrative burdens 
on the competitive position of firms in the European dairy industry. This industry is – on 
average- highly competitive and innovative. However, especially for future growth, the dairy 
industry will have to operate on the world market rather than on the European market, with 
specialized, innovative and distinctive products. Excessive administrative burdens connected 
with hierarchical market structure will not be in the interest of the dairy industry.  
A positive perception of the form of regulations is strongly related to the size of companies. 
As Doyle proposes (Doyle, 2007) firms should be supported to close the gap between 
regulation dissemination and the translation of such regulation in knowledge at the firm level, 
to maintain competitive. Possibilities to monitor the level of compliance are limited, so 
instruments to increase food safety should benefit to the producer; in this way, voluntary 
compliance is stimulated.  
Although companies depict areas where EU food law could be simplified and specific areas 
of regulations are seen as burdensome, they have a preference for the European system, 
which puts food safety above ex-post litigation. 
A distinction should be made between the form and the content of food law. Especially 
product innovative companies are dissatisfied with the content of food law. Time-to-market 
of new output is long, costs are relatively (compared to the US) high, and procedures are not 
transparent. Legal prescriptions are scattered and a comprehensive overview is often lacking 
(see Van der Meulen (2008) for details). 
Co-labelling (printing the name on the package of the end-producer/retailer) is only 
beneficial (benefits outweigh administrative burdens) if the upstream product is differentiated 
(not easy to copy). For commodities (homogeneous produce which is supplied by many 
companies) upscaling in intermediary production stages will be inevitable, to reduce costs. In 
the long run, commodity-producing SMEs will necessarily merge to the benefit of economies 
of scale. Upscaling of commodity-production will be to the benefit of efficiency of food 
supply chains and should therefore not be obstructed. 
Origin labelling will hide intra-communal food safety and quality differences. The positive 
side is that it could stimulate exports (especially to non-western countries). Companies will 
prefer to distinguish themselves on their brand-name, PGI/PDO and food safety and quality 
characteristics. Origin labelling (a ‘made in EU’-label) can have a contra-productive effect, 
because it hides company- and country-specific differences. Moreover, the EU as a whole 
will be vulnerable should food- or political problems occur. 
Last, food safety and quality systems appear to be more primarily provoked by consumer 
wishes. So the costs which are connected to them would possibly have been made anyway, 
even if food legislation would not make systems mandatory. To reduce administrative 
burdens, we advice to integrate food safety and quality requirements is necessary. It would 
reduce monitoring and reporting costs, both for private as well as public parties. 
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